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Abstract
This paper explores the effectiveness of network attack when the attacker has imperfect information about the
network. For Erdös-Rényi networks, we observe that dynamical importance and betweenness centrality-based
attacks are surprisingly robust to the presence of a moderate amount of imperfect information and are more effective
compared with simpler degree-based attacks even at moderate levels of network information error. In contrast, for
scale-free networks the effectiveness of attack is much less degraded by a moderate level of information error.
Furthermore, in the Erdös-Rényi case the effectiveness of network attack is much more degraded by missing links as
compared with the same number of false links.

I. Introduction
Many complex dynamical processes are supported by networks of interconnections between a large number
of individual elements (e.g., epidemics [1-4], cancer spread [5],electrical power distribution [6,7], etc.).
Interventions that seek to degrade [8-13] or protect [13-16] network connectivity are thus of great interest. In
particular, strategies for network attack by node or link removal have been intensively studied. Key issues have been
the dependence of the attack effectiveness upon network topology and the strategy for selecting nodes or links for
removal. We note, however, that, while such previous studies have predominantly presumed the attacker to have
perfect knowledge of the network to be attacked, this is very often not the case. Specifically, networks inferred from
measurements typically have false links and miss true links. One might suppose that these errors could very much
lower the effectiveness of attack strategies. The purpose of this paper is to address this important issue for the case
of node removal attacks of undirected networks (directed networks are treated in Appendix A).
One example of a network attack problem is an attempt to stop the spread of a disease with a limited
number of vaccinations: the people who receive the vaccinations are chosen on the basis of their position in the
social network [8-13]. Another example is that of deriving gene therapies for cancer. Here the goal is to select those
genes whose disabling would most inhibit cancer cell survival and proliferation [5,17]. Yet another example is the
study of the resilience of the Internet to intentional attack [8,12]. The typical attack strategy is to calculate some
centrality measure of each node, and to then attack (disable, vaccinate, or remove) those nodes with the highest
values of this measure. However, an attacker with imperfect network information will determine values of these
centrality measures with some error, and using these would be expected to degrade the effectiveness of his attack.
Imperfect network information is ubiquitous in applications and can arise in various ways. Examples of link errors
can be found in online social networks, where a friendship may be indicated despite the two subjects having never
personally met, or inversely, if no online friendship exists between two face-to-face friends. In the previously cited
example of cancer gene therapy, genes are selected for disabling based upon an estimated gene interaction network
inferred from noisy measurements (e.g., measurements of gene expression [18,19]). Recently, Platig et al. studied
the effects of link errors on the correlation between network centrality measures inferred from true and erroneous
network information [20].
One conclusion of past work for the case where the network is exactly known is that a strategy based on the
globally dependent node centrality measure of betweenness (defined subsequently) is particularly effective [9]. On
the other hand, one might suspect that more effective globally-based strategies are also less robust to error in
network knowledge. Our main conclusions are as follows:
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(i) For Erdös-Rényi networks, strategies based on global information are surprisingly robust and maintain a clear
advantage over the simple node degree-based attack up to moderate amounts of network error.
(ii) Scale-free networks display much less dependence on the attack strategy (for strategies based on sensibly chosen
centrality measures) and much less degradation of attacks by network information error.
(iii) For Erdös-Rényi networks attack effectiveness is degraded much more by missing links as compared with the
same number of false links.
(iv) Comparing the two global strategies that we test, namely betweenness [21,22] and dynamical importance [23],
betweenness is often slightly more effective at low network error (at the expense of substantially greater
computational cost), but the two tend to perform more equally at moderate network error or a relatively small
number of attacked nodes.
(v) As shown in the Appendix, results (i)-(iv) demonstrated in this paper for undirected networks also apply to
directed networks.
We next describe the numerical experiments that yield results (i)-(iv).

II. Model
For our “true” networks, we consider two types of random networks: Erdös-Rényi, in which the degree
(number of links to a node) has a binomial distribution, and scale-free [24], in which the degree distribution obeys a
power law:
𝑃𝑘 =

𝑘 −𝛾
−𝛾
max
∑𝑘𝑖=1
𝑘𝑖

where Pk is the probability that a randomly chosen node has degree k. The three node centrality measures upon
which we base attack strategies are as follows:
(i) The degree centrality, which is simply the degree of a node.
(ii) The betweenness centrality of a node is the fraction of shortest paths between all node pairs that pass through
that particular node. Let σ(s,t) be the number of shortest paths between nodes s and t, and σi(s,t) to be the number of
shortest paths between s and t that pass through node i. The betweenness of node i is
𝑏𝑖 =

∑
𝑠,𝑡,𝑠≠𝑡≠𝑖

𝜎𝑖 (𝑠, 𝑡)
𝜎(𝑠, 𝑡)

(iii) The dynamical importance of a node is a measure of the change in the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency
matrix (which is typically real and positive) upon removal of that node. For an undirected network, elements of the
adjacency matrix A are Aij = Aij = 1 if there is a link between nodes j and i, and Aij = Aji = 0 otherwise. Let λ denote
the largest eigenvalue of A, so that Av = λv for the corresponding eigenvector v. Upon removing a node s from the
network, and consequently deleting all links attached to it, the matrix A is changed by setting all the matrix elements
in row s and column s to zero (Ast = Ats = 0 for all t). We use Δλs to denote the resultant change in λ. The dynamical
importance of the node s is defined as
𝑑𝑠 = −

Δ𝜆𝑠
𝜆

with λ being the eigenvalue of the matrix before removal of node s.
We generate “noisy” networks from the true networks by adding false links to the system and removing
true links. (We refer to true links which have been removed as “missing” links.) Our method for generating noisy
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networks is as follows [20]: mtδ links are omitted randomly, where mt is the number of links in the true network and
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Links are only eligible for omission if they are part of the true network; false links added in the adding
process will not be omitted. While each link has an equal probability of being deleted, higher-degree nodes have a
higher probability of losing a link, as they have more links. In addition, mtα false links are added to the network.
False links are placed between random pairs of nodes, provided that a link does not already exist between them in
the true network. Overall our false network model is characterized by the two parameters δ and α, respectively
representing the error levels associated with missing and false links.

III. Results
The networks are of size N = 2500, with the maximum possible degree of a node set at kmax = N/2 = 1250.
The Erdös-Rényi networks have an average degree zer = 4, and the scale-free-degree networks have γ ≈ 2.06 and
average degree zsf = 4. In the scale-free networks, we require that the degree of each node is at least 1. The networks
are constructed according to the configuration model [25]. Next, a noisy network is constructed based on the
parameters α and δ. The centrality measure is calculated from the existing noisy network, and the highest-centrality
node is removed from both the true and noisy networks. If there is more than one node having the same highest
value centrality measure, one of those is chosen randomly for removal. Then, we calculate the size of the Giant
Component (GC) in the true network (The GC is the largest collection of nodes such that any pair of nodes in the
GC is connected by a path along links.). To reiterate, the idea here is that network attacks are based on the
information in the noisy network, but the effects of these attacks are actually felt on the true network. After each
removal, we recalculate the centrality measure based on the new noisy network (with the previously attacked node
deleted), and remove the highest centrality node from both networks again, and recalculate the GCC size. This
process is continued until all nodes are deleted.
Here, we present the results of numerical simulations exploring the effects of network information errors on
attack. Results are averaged over 50 different network realizations. Figure 1 presents the size of the giant connected
component of undirected true networks plotted against the number of nodes removed in attack (both normalized by
N) for Erdös-Rényi and scale-free networks, both for attacks with perfect information (Figs. 1(a) and 1(c)) and for
attacks with imperfect information (α = δ = 0.25) (Figs. 1(b) and 1(d)). We plot results for attacks based on our
three centrality measures (betweenness, dynamical importance, and degree) and, as a baseline, also include results
for the case where nodes are successively removed at random. We see that in the case of the Erdös-Rényi networks
(Figs. 1(a) and 1(b)), the betweenness and dynamical importance strategies are significantly better than the degree
and random strategies, even with an additional 25% false links added, and 25% of true links deleted.
Furthermore, we see that the betweenness strategy is slightly more efficient than the dynamical importance
strategy in the case of no error, and they become approximately equal when error is present. In the case of the
undirected scale-free networks (Figs. 1(c) and 1(d)), we find that the degree attack is relatively insensitive to this
moderate amount of error. Restricting attention to reductions of the GC to as low as 10% of its original size, in
contrast with the Erdös-Rényi case, we see that for the scale-free case there is relatively little difference between the
different strategies and relatively a much less dramatic effect of moderate network error.
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Figure 1. The size of the GC normalized by the number of nodes N versus the normalized number of nodes removed
Nr/N, for betweenness, dynamical importance, degree, and random strategies for undirected Erdös-Rényi and scalefree networks, both shown with no error, and with α = δ = 0.25.
Figure 2 shows GC attack curves for undirected networks subjected to betweenness and dynamical
importance attacks, with different types of error. Figure 2(a) for Erdös-Rényi networks shows that at moderate levels
of error, (α, δ) = (0.25,0), (0,0.25) and (0.25,0.25), attacks are more robust to the addition of false links as compared
with the omission of the same number of true links. Again, while for (α, δ) = (0,0) betweenness based attack is
somewhat more effective than dynamical importance based attack, this difference essentially disappears when either
of the moderate error types shown are present.

Figure 2. The normalized GC size versus the normalized number of removed nodes for betweenness and dynamical
importance strategies for undirected (a) Erdös-Rényi and (b) Scale-free networks.
Since Figs. 1(c,d) showed quite weak effects of moderate network error (α, δ) = (0.25,0.25) for scale-free
networks, we are lead to consider substantially higher levels of network error for the scale-free case. Consequently,
in Fig. 2(b) we show results for scale-free networks with (α, δ) = (0,0),(0,0.75),(1,0),(1,0.75) (note that α = 1 means
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that the number of added false links is the same as the number of true links). Even at these high network error
values, we find little effect of network error for reductions of the GC size by up to 0.5. For greater reductions of the
GC size network error becomes significant, but very great GC reductions are still achieved at relatively small Nr/N.
(compared with the Erdös-Rényi case). The effective absence of network error impact for scale-free networks and
|GC|/N 0.5 can be understood on the basis that reductions of GC size in this range are achieved by removal of a
relatively small number of nodes that have extraordinarily high betweenness and importance centrality measures.
Random addition of false links, even if it doubles the number of perceived links is unlikely to produce any nodes
with centrality measures as high as the true hubs, which will hence still be highly ranked for attack. On the other
hand, random deletions with δ = 0.75, on average reduces the degrees of all nodes, roughly proportionally, and
assuming connectivity is still maintained between the true hubs, they will still by highly ranked for removal.

IV. Discussion
We have investigated the impact of imperfect network information on the effectiveness of nodal attack
based on different centrality measures (degree, betweenness, and importance). Our results indicate strong
dependence on the network degree distribution and on whether the network error is through false links or through
missing true links. One implication of the latter finding is that, in the absence of hubs, network inference from noisy
data (as in the cancer gene therapy application referred to at the beginning of the paper) should employ a somewhat
weaker threshold for link inference (in order to favor inclusion of true links at the possible expense of the addition of
false links in the inferred network). There are many possible future extensions of this general line of study, such as
investigation of link attacks, the impacts of other network topological characteristics beyond degree distribution
(e.g., assortativity by degree [26], community structure [27] , small worldness [28], motifs [29], network
hierarchical topology [30], and multilayer structure [31]), considerations of network error in formulating attacks
tailored to disruption of specific dynamical processes (e.g., epidemic spread), etc.
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Appendix A: Directed Networks
The results and discussion in the main text are restricted to the case of undirected networks. Here in Figs.
A1 and A2 we give results for directed networks analogous to Figs. 1 and 2. To accommodate directedness, Figs. A1
and A2 have two new aspects not present in Figs. 1 and 2: (i) the curves for attack based on degree centrality in Figs.
1 and 2 are now each replaced by two curves, one for in-degree-based attack, and one for out-degree-based attack;
and (ii) the vertical axes in Figs. A1 and A2 are the normalized size of the Giant Strongly Connected Component
(GSCC) rather than the GC of Figs. 1 and 2 (the GSCC is the largest collection of nodes such that for each pair (i, j)
of nodes in the GSCC there is a directed path along links both from i to j and from j to i). The parameters and degree
distributions used for Figs. A1 and A2 are similar to those for Figs. 1 and 2: N = 2500, kinmax = koutmax = N/2 = 1250
(where kinmax and koutmax denote in-degree and out-degree), the average in-degree and out-degrees for all networks are
4, and, for scale-free networks the in-degree and out-degree distributions are the same with power-law exponent γ ≈
2 for both.

Figure A1. The size of the GSCC normalized by the number of nodes N versus the normalized number of nodes
removed Nr/N, for betweenness, dynamical importance, degree, and random strategies for directed Erdös-Rényi and
scale-free networks, both shown with no error, and with α = δ = 0.25. A general source on this topic is the journal,
Cancer Gene Therapy.
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Figure A2. The normalized GSCC size versus the normalized number of removed nodes for betweenness (solid red
line) and dynamical importance (black dashed line) strategies for directed (a) Erdös-Rényi and (b) scale-free
networks.
Examination of Figs. A1 and A2 shows that the in-degree and out-degree strategies yield similar results.
Furthermore, and most importantly, all of our main general results for undirected networks (points (i)-(iv) at the end
of Sec. I) are seen to apply to directed networks.
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